South Carolina Law Review
Volume 61
Issue 4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 4

Summer 2010

Should a Scintilla Be Enough - The Proper Standard for Summary
Judgment in South Carolina
Aaron J. Hayes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hayes, Aaron J. (2010) "Should a Scintilla Be Enough - The Proper Standard for Summary Judgment in
South Carolina," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 61 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Hayes: Should a Scintilla Be Enough - The Proper Standard for Summary Ju
SHOULD A SCINTILLA BE ENOUGH? THE PROPER STANDARD FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hancock v. Mid-South Management Co.,' the South Carolina Supreme
Court expressed its unique stance on the burden of proof in summary judgment
motions. The facts of the case are straightforward: Betty J. Hancock tripped and
fell in a parking lot maintained by Mid-South Management and filed suit against
Mid-South for negligence, claiming that Mid-South had failed to maintain its
parking lot in a safe condition and had failed to warn her of the dangers that
caused her injuries. 2 Mid-South moved for summary judgment on the ground
that because the elevation changes in the parking lot were open and obvious,
Mid-South had no duty to warn Hancock about them.3 At the summary judgment
hearing, the parties provided deposition testimony of both Hancock and another
witness, as well as photographs of the area, and the trial court held that the
elevation change in the parking lot that caused Hancock's injuries was indeed4
open and obvious and that Mid-South had no duty to warn Hancock about it.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mid-South could be liable for
failing to warn Hancock of an open and obvious danger if Mid-South should
have anticipated the risk of harm to invitees despite the openness and
5
obviousness of the danger. The court held that a genuine issue of fact existed as
to whether the raised pavement was a dangerous condition that Mid-South
should have anticipated and that summary judgment was therefore
inappropriate. 6
Not only did the court reverse the court of appeals on the merits of the case,
but it also addressed an admittedly nondispositive issue. 7 Specifically, the court
chose to settle a dispute among the lower courts regarding the standard for
summary judgment for different types of issues in state court:
[W]e hold that in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence
burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere
scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary
judgment. However, in cases requiring a heightened burden of proof or

1.
2.

381 S.C. 326, 673 S.E.2d 801 (2009).
Id. at 329, 673 S.E.2d at 802.

3.

Id.

4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id. at 331, 673 S.E.2d at 803.
Id. at 332, 673 S.E.2d at 803.

7.

See id. at 331 n.3, 673 S.E.2d at 803 n.3. In its brief, counsel for Mid-South did not raise

the summary judgment standard as a primary issue in the case; instead, counsel simply noted in a

footnote that the standard for summary judgment in South Carolina was unclear from the case law.
Brief of Respondent at 7 n.1, Hancock, 381 S.C. 326, 673 S.E.2d 801 (No. 2004-CP-36-171).
Predictably, Mid-South asserted its belief that the higher federal standard was appropriate. See id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2010

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61: 737

in cases applying federal law, we hold that the non-moving party must
submit more than a 8mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for
summary judgment.
Thus, the decision of the court bifurcated the state's summary judgment
standard. For state questions where the burden of proof is the preponderance of
the evidence, the nonmoving party need demonstrate no more than a mere
scintilla of evidence to defeat summary judgment. For a federal question, the
nonmoving party presumably must meet the higher standard described by the
United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.9:
[T]he judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence
unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury
could return a verdict for the [nonmovant] on the evidence presented.
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]. 1°
Thus, the difference between South Carolina's standard and the federal
standard is ultimately one of degree: federal courts require a plaintiff to bring
reasonable evidence to the table to get past a defendant's motion for summary
judgment, while South Carolina state courts, when deciding most state law
questions, require only that the plaintiff present something to support her
position.
This bifurcated standard-with its low threshold for most state questions and
its higher threshold for federal questions-is unique among the states and places
South Carolina far behind the national trend of abandoning the scintilla
standard.11 Part II of this Essay will examine the history of the scintilla rule from
its origins at common law to its near complete abandonment in the twentieth
century. Part II will also look at the complicated history of the rule in South
Carolina and the conflicting case law from the court of appeals on the issue until
the supreme court decided Hancock in 2009. Part III will discuss the probable

8.
Hancock, 381 S.C. at 330-31, 673 S.E.2d at 803. It is important to recognize that the
court used the language of precedent--"we hold"--to begin its description of the summary
judgment standard in state court, despite the court's statement that the issue was nondispositive. See
id. at 331 n.3, 673 S.E.2d at 803 n.3. This author contends, and urges the practitioner to consider,
that the court considers its articulation of the standard in Hancock to carry the force of law.
9.
477 U.S. 242 (1986). In the federal system, summary judgment motions are made
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
10. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
11. See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, Choice of Law GoverningProof 58 HARV. L. REV. 153,
178 (1944) (stating that, as of the time of the publishing of the article, only Alabama and South
Carolina maintained a version of the scintilla standard); 26 R.C.L. Trial § 76 (1929) (stating that
abandonment of the scintilla doctrine is the majority position). For further discussion of the scintilla
standard historically and nationally, see infra Part II.A.
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effects of the Hancock standard, both positive and negative, on the practice of
seeking summary judgment in South Carolina state courts. Finally, the end of
Part III will offer advice to practitioners operating under this new regime.
Ultimately, the effect of the scintilla standard set forth in Hancock will be to
allow cases to proceed past the summary judgment stage without reasonable
evidence, hindering judicial efficiency in South Carolina by allowing legally
meritless claims to proceed to trial.
II.

HISTORY OF THE SCINTILLA STANDARD

Traditionally, courts have applied the scintilla standard when ruling on
motions for judgment as a matter of law (directed verdict) and on renewed
motions for judgment as a matter of law (judgment notwithstanding the
verdict).12 The Supreme Court in Anderson equated a court's analysis of
evidence on these motions with the analysis to be made on a summary judgment
motion: "In essence, . .. the inquiry under each [motion] is the same: whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or13
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
Accordingly, the cases that follow discuss the scintilla standard in the context of
motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, or both 14 and demonstrate the
prevailing trend of abrogating the standard.
A.

The Scintilla Standard Historically and Nationally: Nugent as the
Exemplar of the ChangingTimes

Perhaps the most useful discussion of the history of the scintilla standard is
the Kentucky Court of Appeals's 15 sweeping treatment of the rule in Nugent v.
Nugent's Executor. 6 The court, in characterizing the rule as "dead wood" and

12. See Nugent v. Nugent's Ex'r, 135 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Ky. 1940).
13. Anderson, 477 U.S. at251-52.
14. See, e.g., Dutton v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 104 S.C. 16, 30-31, 88 S.E. 263, 267 (1916)
(citing Howell v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 99 S.C. 417, 421, 83 S.E. 639, 641 (1914)) (discussing
the scintilla rule in either the antiquated nonsuit motion or motion for a directed verdict).
15. The court of appeals was the highest court in Kentucky prior to 1976.
16. 135 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1940). For the law in other jurisdictions expressly abandoning the
rule, see, for example, ALA. CODE § 12-21-12 (LexisNexis 2005), which abolishes the scintilla rule
in any motion in a civil action that tests the sufficiency of the evidence, including motions for
summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict; Huffey v. Lea (In re
Estate of Olson), 479 N.W.2d 610, 615 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991), which states that a summary
judgment motion is "finctionally akin to a directed verdict" motion and that a mere scintilla of
evidence is not sufficient to survive such a motion; Hamden Lodge No. 517, .O.O.F. v. Ohio Fuel
Gas Co., 189 N.E. 246, 251 (Ohio 1934), where the court called for the abandonment of "the use of
the term 'scintilla'; Proctor v. White, 155 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Tex. App. 2004), which notes that
more than a scintilla of evidence is necessary to overcome a no-evidence motion for summary
judgment; and Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. F. W. Stock & Sons, 51 S.E. 161, 165 (Va. 1905), which
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choosing to abandon it, nevertheless opted to detail the history of the rule and its
application at various stages of litigation.17 In Nugent, the trial court had granted
a motion for directed verdict in a will dispute, presumably holding that the
18
plaintiffs had failed to produce a scintilla of evidence that the will was invalid.
The court of appeals, on the other hand, noted that the testimony of one witness
for the plaintiffs "not only constitute[d] a scintilla of evidence, but might be
thought to be of such potency as being sufficient to sustain a verdict [for the
plaintiffs] were it not arrayed against an abundance of most convincing and...
overwhelming testimony [on behalf of the defendant]." 19 Because the court was
abandoning the scintilla rule in its opinion, it continued through its analysis of all
of the evidence in the case and concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly
favored the defense and that the granting of the motion for directed verdict
should therefore be affirmed.20
Ultimately, the court framed the issue as follows: "[S]hall we continue to
follow the scintilla rule prevailing in this jurisdiction from the beginning? We
have determined that we should not do so and that ... another step should be
taken to bring us into harmony with the well nigh unanimous rule of practice in
state and federal courts., 21 As motivation for abandoning the rule, the court
considered the history of the scintilla standard dating back to the time of
Blackstone and the early common law. 22 Because judges have always been able
to set aside verdicts that were not sustained by the evidence, it only made sense
that judges should be able to stop a case from going to the jury if they realized
that a later verdict may simply be set aside. The Nugent court concluded,
though, that the judiciary's fear of infringing on the role of the jury led to the
24
development of the scintilla standard.
With the imposition of this standard,
25
"logic and reason were abandoned.,
Further, the Nugent court stated that the precise meaning of "scintilla" is
"nebulous and shadowy" but that "[t]he most usual method of reference is that if
there is 'any' evidence sustaining the plaintiffs case it must be submitted to the
jury. 2 6 After setting forth this definition, the court noted the phenomenon of
trial courts "enlarg[ing] the quantum of evidence necessary to constitute a
scintilla" in an effort to deal with injustices done against movants whose
evidence was substantially more compelling than the evidence of their

held that the scintilla rule no longer prevails because it is not "consonant with reason." For more
information on the overall abandonment of the scintilla doctrine, see 26 R.C.L. Trial § 76 (1929).
17. See Nugent, 135 S.W.2d at 881-83.
18. See id. at 878.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 879.
See id. at 879-81,883.
Id. at 881.
See id. (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 882.
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opponents. 27 In short, courts in Kentucky were paying lip service to the scintilla
rule but actually requiring nonmovants to show enough evidence to reasonably
support a verdict. 28 Nugent's abandonment of the scintilla rule, then, was simply
an official judicial recognition of an existing reality. The scintilla rule was based
on dubious origins, had lost favor nationally, and was not actually applied in trial
courts in Kentucky regardless of its technical presence in the case law.29
Nugent, by its own terms, was consistent with a national trend.3 0 Edmund M.
Morgan, in his article Choice of Law Governing Proof studied the trend through
1944.31 According to Morgan, by 1944, "[t]he scintilla rule [applied] only in
Alabama and South Carolina." 32 Alabama abandoned the rule by statute in
1987. 33 Further, while Alaska and Hawaii did not figure into Morgan's study4
because they were not states in 1944, in 2009, neither state observed the rule.
Thus, since 1987, South Carolina has been the only state to employ the scintilla
rule. 35 Undoubtedly, the South Carolina Supreme Court's reiteration of the rule
in Hancock goes against the modem, supermajority rule.
B.

The Scintilla Standard in South Carolina: Confusion in the Court of
Appeals Before Hancock

National considerations aside, the scintilla standard, at least in the summary
judgment context, has had a long and varied history in the lower courts of South
Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court defined the standard as early as
1942 in Young v. Hyman Motors, Inc.,36 but that case involved an appeal from an
agency determination rather than a motion for summary judgment. There, the
court noted that a scintilla is "any material evidence that, if true, would tend to

27. Id.at 882-83. Note that this phenomenon is explicitly present in South Carolina case law.
See Young v. Hyman Motors, Inc., 199 S.C. 233, 243, 19 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1942) (citing Nat'l Bank
of Honea Path v. Thomas J. Barrett, Jr., & Co., 173 S.C. 1,5, 174 S.E. 581, 582-83 (1934));
discussion infra Parts 1I.B, III.B.
28. See Nugent, 135 S.W.2d at 882-83.
29. See id. at 881-83.
30. Seeid.at881.
31. See Morgan, supra note 11, at 163 (noting the perplexing situation that arises in choice of
law issues when the law of the forum and the law being used apply different standards of proof on
an issue before the court).
32. Id. at 178.
33. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-12 hist. n. (LexisNexis 2005).
34. See Beal v. McGuire, 216 P.3d 1154, 1161 (Alaska 2009) (citing Maines v. Kenworth
Alaska, Inc., 155 P.3d 318, 323 (Alaska 2007)); Yoneda v. Tom, 133 P.3d 796, 813-14 (Haw.
2006) (citing Springwall, Inc. v. Timeless Bedding, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 410, 416 (M.D.N.C.
2002)).
35. But see infra Part II.B (discussing the vacillation of the South Carolina Court of Appeals
on this issue).
36. 199 S.C. 233, 19 S.E.2d 109 (1942).
37. Seeid. at235, 19S.E.2dat 10.
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establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror."38 The court also noted that
there was a supplement to the rule, which allowed the judge to take the case from
39
the jury if but one "reasonable inference" was possible from the evidence.
Young is significant because it incorporates the Anderson notion of
reasonableness4 ° into the scintilla standard, though Young's
41 statements arguably
are called into question by the court's decision in Hancock.
Apparently, the South Carolina Court of Appeals viewed the standard for
overcoming a summary judgment motion as an open question, and from 1991 to
2007, just two years before Hancock, it issued a conflicting series of decisions.
First, in 1991, in Dickert v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,42 the court of
appeals followed the lead of Anderson and stated that "the existence of a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving 4party's
position is not
3
sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment."
A year later, however, in Anders v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co.,44 the court of appeals reached a different conclusion: the court
noted that "[a]t the summary judgment stage of the proceeding, it was only
necessary... to submit a scintilla of evidence warranting a determination by the
,05
jury. 4 5 Interestingly, the
Anders court cites no authority for this proposition. 46
Furthermore, the opinion does not mention Dickert at all. As a result, an attorney
in 1992 could find valid case law from the court of appeals supporting two
contrary propositions: the scintilla rule was valid under Anders and invalid under
Dickert.
From 1992 to 1996, the court of appeals appeared to be abandoning the
scintilla standard.47 The leading case during this time period is Bravis v.
Dunbar, which quoted Dickert in setting aside that standard: "A party opposing
a properly supported motion for summary judgment.., must set forth or point to
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, the

38. Id.at 242-43, 19 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting Turner v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 260,
263, 180 S.E. 55, 57 (1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 243, 19 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting Nat'l Bank of Honea Path v. Thomas J. Barrett, Jr.,
& Co., 173 S.C. 1,5, 174 S.E. 581, 582 (1934)).
40. As previously discussed, the United States Supreme Court in Anderson set the burden of
proof for defeating a summary judgment motion as evidence sufficient to allow a jury to reasonably
find for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
41. See infra Part JII.B (discussing Hancock's marginalization of Young).
42. 306 S.C. 311, 411 S.E.2d 672 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 311 S.C. 218,
428 S.E.2d 700 (1993).
43. Id.at 313, 411 S.E.2d at 673 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
44. 307 S.C. 371, 415 S.E.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1992).
45. Id. at 375, 415 S.E.2d at 408.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Pryor v. Nw. Apartments, Ltd., 321 S.C. 524, 526, 469 S.E.2d 630, 632 (Ct.
App. 1996) (citing Bravis v. Dunbar, 316 S.C. 263, 265, 449 S.E.2d 495, 496 (Ct. App. 1994))
(stating that a scintilla of evidence is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment); Bravis,
316 S.C. at 265, 449 S.E.2d at 496 (citing Dickert, 306 S.C. at 313, 411 S.E.2d at 673) (same).
48. 316 S.C. 263, 449 S.E.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1994).
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existence of a mere scintilla of evidence ... is not sufficient. 'A9 For the Bravis
court, a mere scintilla of evidence did not generate a genuine issue of fact.50 The
court of appeals reiterated the Bravis and Dickert standard two years later in
Pryorv. NorthwestApartments, Ltd.5 1
At the end of 1996, Judge Ralph King Anderson, Jr. dissented in Strother v.
Lexington County Recreation Commission,52 pointing out the problem created by
the court of appeals over the preceding few years:
Heretofore, the Court of Appeals has issued several opinions
resulting in inconsistency. The Court previously held the existence of a
mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position
is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.
On the other hand, this Court has also stated that at the summary
judgment stage of a proceeding, it is only necessary for the nonmoving
party to submit a scintilla of evidence warranting determination by a
jury for summary judgment to be denied.
In order to provide guidance
to the Bench and Bar, I would hereby
53
expressly overrule ...Anders.
Judge Anderson further criticized the scintilla rule described in Anders,
writing that it was "erroneous. 54 Thus, as early as 1996, the inconsistent
precedent regarding the scintilla rule in summary judgment cases had been noted
by a prominent judge in a published opinion.
In 1998, in Tanner v. Florence City-County Building Commission,55 the
court of appeals issued yet another inconsistent opinion affirming the validity of
the scintilla standard, apparently retreating from Bravis, Dickert, and the relative
stability of the case law on this subject set forth in the mid-1990s. 56 However, in
2007, in Shelton v. LS & K, Inc., the court of appeals favorably cited Bravis
once again, stating that a mere scintilla of evidence was not enough to survive
summary judgment. 58 In Hancock, the South Carolina Supreme Court expressly

49. Id. at 265, 449 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting Dickert, 306 S.C. at 313, 411 S.E.2d at 673)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See id.Obviously, the presence of a nongenuine dispute at trial is undesirable. See infra
Part I.B (discussing the disadvantages of the Hancock decision).
51. 321 S.C. 524, 526, 469 S.E.2d 630, 632 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Bravis, 316 S.C. at 265,
449 S.E.2d at 496).
52. 324 S.C. 611, 479 S.E.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1996).
53. Id.at 623, 479 S.E.2d at 829 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
54. Id.
55. 333 S.C. 549, 511 S.E.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Olson v.
Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 161, 168 n.8, 580 S.E.2d 440, 444 n.8 (2003).
56. See id.at 553, 511 S.E.2d at 371 (citing Anders v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 307
S.C. 371, 375, 415 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ct. App. 1992)).
57. 374 S.C. 294, 648 S.E.2d 307 (Ct. App. 2007).
58. Id. at 297, 648 S.E.2d at 308 (citing Bravis v. Dunbar, 316 S.C. 263, 265, 449 S.E.2d
495, 496 (Ct. App. 1994)).
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noted this inconsistency and chose to favor the Anders line of cases, 59 finally
60
putting an end to the back-and-forth nature of the court of appeals's precedent.
III.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD IN SOUTH
CAROLINA

In light of South Carolina's unique stance on summary judgment and the
supreme court's first truly definitive statement on the issue, it is worthwhile to
discuss the likely repercussions of the scintilla rule, both positive and negative.
A.

Advantages

Regardless of the extraordinary manner in which the supreme court chose to
set forth the summary judgment standard in Hancock,61 the case does provide
two advantages to the South Carolina legal community. First, the case is
consistent with South Carolina Supreme Court rulings regarding the evidence
required to overcome motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV). Specifically, the court in Rogers v. Norfolk Southern Corp.
reached a very similar conclusion to the one set forth in Hancock.63 There, the
court held that when reviewing a JNOV motion on a federal question, South
Carolina courts are to utilize the federal reasonableness standard, which requires
more than a scintilla of evidence for the plaintiff's claim to proceed to the jury.64
In contrast, the court noted that where parties are litigating state-law issues, the
scintilla standard applied to JNOV motions.65 As discussed above, because
motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter of law
involve the same inquiry, the court's decision to affirm the scintilla standard in
Hancock is in line with its holding in Rogers. Also, Rogers shows the court's

59. See Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 330 & n.1, 673 S.E.2d 801, 802 &
n.1 (2009).
60. Though the summary judgment standard for preponderance-of-the-evidence cases was
left to the court of appeals before 2009, the supreme court had reached the issue of the standard in
other contexts before then. See, e.g., Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 479, 609 S.E.2d
286, 298 (2005) (citing Rogers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 356 S.C. 85, 91-92, 588 S.E.2d 87, 90 (2003))
(holding that more than a scintilla of evidence is needed to survive a motion for JNOV in a claim
brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C.
208, 218, 578 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2003) (citing George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 453, 548 S.E.2d 868,
874 (2001)) (holding that a heightened summary judgment standard exists when the burden of proof
at trial is heightened); Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 495 n.6, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 n.6 (2002)
(stating that in a case requiring clear and convincing proof, more than a mere scintilla is needed to
defeat summary judgment).
61. See Hancock, 381 S.C. at 331 n.3, 673 S.E.2d at 803 n.3; supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text.
62. 356 S.C. 85, 588 S.E.2d 87 (2003).
63. See id. at 91-92, 588 S.E.2d at 90.
64. See id. (quoting Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 1988)).
65. See id. at 92, 588 S.E.2d at 90.
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willingness to let the standard vary with the type of question-state or federalbefore a trial court. When viewed in this context, the court's bifurcation of the
standard in the summary judgment context in Hancock echoes the court's
holding in the JNOV context in Rogers.
The second advantage provided by the Hancock decision is perhaps obvious:
with such a low threshold for defeating this pretrial dispositive motion, plaintiffs
with little resources will have an easier time getting their claims in front of a
jury. Plaintiffs with any evidence to support their claims will be able to have
their day in court, and, at least theoretically, the likelihood of a plaintiffs
meritorious claim being dismissed relatively early in the litigation is reduced. As
a result, a typical case in which an individual plaintiff is injured by a larger,
well-funded entity-such as a corporation-will proceed longer, potentially
increasing the corporation's desire to settle. The plaintiff, then, will achieve
recovery through settlement or choose to have his case tried before a jury. In
either situation, the plaintiff is in the strong position of being relatively assured
his case will not be dismissed by the trial judge, 66 a factor that will no doubt
enter into the decision-making strategies of defendants and defense counsel as
they formulate their overall litigation posture. While the Hancock decision no
doubt favors plaintiffs on its face, the ramifications of the low threshold for
defeating summary judgment ripple throughout the litigation.
B. Disadvantages
The potential disadvantages of Hancock are significant. First, a lower
standard for defeating summary judgment will result in more summary judgment
motions being denied on claims that would not merit trial in the federal system.
With this decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court has largely negated
a
67
primary tool for accomplishing judicial efficiency in the disposition of cases.
Second, having two different standards for defeating summary judgmentone standard for certain state issues and another standard for federal issuesmay foster confusion in the implementation of both. For example, there exists
the possibility of contradictory results in the same lawsuit when a state claim and
a federal claim trigger the same factual questions. If the defendant moved for
summary judgment based on the shared factual issue, the trial court, operating
under Hancock, would have to examine the same evidence through different
lenses. If the evidence represented a mere scintilla but was insufficient to allow a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court would have no
choice but to deny the motion with respect to the state claim but grant the motion
on the federal claim. Undoubtedly, such incongruous results are undesirable in

66. Indeed, such a standard will undoubtedly leave an easier decision for the trial judge
because she need not conduct the Anderson-style reasonableness analysis of the evidence at hand.
See infra Part LI.C (discussing advice to practitioners).
67. Cf S.C. R. CIV. P. 1 ("[The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
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any court system, but they are a distinct possibility in a system with a bifurcated
standard.
The court also fosters confusion in its failure to provide any guidance for the
standard in cases involving state law claims subject to the clear-and-convincing
burden of proof.68 Hancock explained that "in cases requiring a heightened
burden of proof.., we hold that the non-moving party must submit more than a
mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment." 69 But
the court failed to clarify what "more than a mere scintilla" means. A trial court
could reasonably apply the federal standard to these cases and remain true to the
exact wording of the Hancock decision. That same wording, on the other hand,
leaves open the possibility of some intermediate quantum of evidence between a
scintilla and the federal reasonableness test. In an area of law that has already
produced so many conflicting holdings from the court of appeals, the supreme
court's own indeterminate language does little to guide trial courts as they
examine summary judgment motions in clear-and-convincing cases.
The third disadvantage of the scintilla rule is its inherent unreasonableness.
In Hancock, the court draws a clear distinction between the scintilla standard and
the federal test: "The rule followed in the federal court system provides that a
mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to withstand the challenge .... [But]
we hold that.., the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla
of evidence., 70 The federal standard, as stated in Anderson, requires enough
evidence to allow a "fair-minded jury" reasonably to find for the nonmoving
party. 71 The scintilla rule, as envisioned by the court in Hancock, therefore, must
require something less than what it would take to convince a reasonable juror to
find for the nonmovant. The unavoidable result is that South Carolina has crafted
a rule that allows cases to progress to trial with an unreasonably small amount of
evidence. Further, in light of the virtually complete equation of the summary
judgment motion and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
South Carolina's case law allows unreasonable evidence to support a verdict.
Such low evidentiary production standards at all phases of litigation are selfevidently problematic.
Finally, the scintilla standard set forth in Hancock, coupled with the
bifurcation of the standard between state and federal questions, disallows any
flexibility in the summary judgment system that existed under the holding of
Young. As noted, Young affirmed the definition of "scintilla" from Turner v.

68. The clear-and-convincing burden of proof is applied most notably in will disputes. See
Patton v. Reames (In re Estate of Pallister), 363 S.C. 437, 448, 611 S.E.2d 250, 256 (2005) (citing
Lowe v. Fickling, 207 S.C. 442, 447, 36 S.E.2d 293, 294-95 (1945); Golini v. Bolton (In re Estate
of Arant), 326 S.C. 333, 340, 482 S.E.2d 784, 788 (Ct. App. 1997); Carlton v. Mason (In re Estate
of Mason), 289 S.C. 273, 277, 346 S.E.2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1986)).
69. Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 330-31, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009).
70. Id. at 330-31, 673 S.E.2d at 802-03 (quoting Rogers, 356 S.C. at 92, 588 S.E.2d at 90)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
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American Motorists Insurance Co.,72 but the South Carolina Supreme Court did
not stop there:
Whilst adhering to the scintilla rule, this court has recognized a rule
supplemental to the scintilla rule ...more founded upon common sense
and reason, to the effect [that] when only one reasonable inference...
can be deduced from the evidence, it becomes
73 a question of law for the
court, and not a question of fact for the jury.
In short, the court put a reasonableness element into the scintilla standard.
According to Morgan, this interpretation "so nearly approaches orthodoxy, that
South Carolina cases are likely to raise no new questions of conflicts on
adequacy of evidence. 74 Thus, the scintilla rule in South Carolina, when viewed
solely through the lens of Young, would have been simply another example of
courts paying lip service to the rule but not really applying it, such as the
Kentucky Court of Appeals described in Nugent. 5 Arguably, the supreme
court's holding in Hancock calls the validity of Young into question on this issue,
because in Hancock, the court expressly stated that there are two standards for
summary judgment in South Carolina. By definition, then, there must be some
distinguishing feature between the standards in order for courts to apply them
appropriately. In an effort to achieve this distinction, it is entirely conceivable
that trial courts will have to disregard the much broader language of Young in
order to effectuate the Hancock holding. Whatever discretion was previously
given to trial judges under Young with respect to the scintilla standard is now
gone. Instead, a scintilla is only a scintilla, and at least according to the United
States Supreme Court in Anderson, such a quantum of evidence is not the most
reasonable standard.77
C. Commentary: Flaws in the StandardOutweigh the Advantages and the
StandardShould Be Reformed: Advice to Defense Practitioners Working in
a Post-HancockSystem
In light of the dominant national trend and the aforementioned drawbacks of
the rule as compared to the advantages, South Carolina should abandon the

72. 176 S.C. 260, 180 S.E. 55 (1935).
73. Young v. Hyman Motors, Inc., 199 S.C. 233, 243, 19 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1942) (quoting
Nat'l Bank of Honea Path v. Thomas J. Barrett, Jr., & Co., 173 S.C. 1, 5, 174 S.E. 581, 582-83
(1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Morgan, supra note 11, at 178. Note the irony in Morgan's proclamation in light of South
Carolina's refusal to update the standard officially-contrary to the prevailing rule in other statesin the sixty-five year gap between his article and the Hancock decision.
75. See Nugent v. Nugent's Ex'r, 135 S.W.2d 877, 882-83 (Ky. 1940).
76. See Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 330-31, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803
(2009).
77. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
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scintilla standard altogether in favor of the higher reasonableness standard from
Anderson. The application of a uniform, higher standard would increase judicial
efficiency by increasing summary judgments in cases with no reasonable
evidence on one side. 78 Such a scenario conserves judicial resources for more
meritorious cases. 79 In the meantime, defense practitioners who seek summary
judgment on behalf of their clients must operate under this newly confirmed
scintilla regime. Though obtaining summary judgment is now more difficult,
several key pieces of advice will allow practicing lawyers to enhance their
chances under this system.
First, members of the South Carolina Bar must be conscious of the rule in
order to present their motions appropriately before courts. Before Hancock, an
attorney practicing in the state had colorable arguments on either side of the
summary judgment standard debate. 80 Specifically, defense practitioners could
cite the Shelton/Bravis line of cases to argue that more than a scintilla of
evidence was required to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. Even though a plaintiffs attorney could also point to equally valid
case law for the opposite conclusion-the Anders line of cases-defense counsel
had the opportunity to argue the point before the trial judge. Clearly, the
Hancock decision stops the debate on this issue, and defense attorneys should
beware that case law they may have used for several years is no longer valid.
Attorneys, however, can adjust their summary judgment strategies accordingly,
including aggressively seeking removal to federal court when possible. 81
A second suggestion for defense attorneys concerns the advice that they give
to their clients, particularly out-of-state clients being sued in South Carolina.
Because the likelihood of getting summary judgment granted has undoubtedly
decreased, counsel should advise clients that the expense of trial might be
unavoidable in cases where the opponent has at least some shred of evidence to
support its position. Summary judgment, then, is not the route such clients
should pursue in seeking to dispose of the case before trial. Rather, such
defendants should more actively pursue settlement negotiations if, from the
client's perspective, trial must be avoided. Without question, defendants haled
into court on factually meritless claims will be frustrated by the virtual
unavailability of summary judgment as a viable, relatively inexpensive option
for disposing of the case. Defense counsel should thus be up front with the client

78. For an excellent discussion of the purpose and benefits of summary judgment, see
generally Robert G. Kerrigan, Allowing Interlocutory Appeals from Orders Denying Summary
Judgment, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2006, at 42, 42-51, which discusses the impact of pretrial review on
institutional efficiency.
79. See id. at 42.
80. See supra Part II.B.
81. Generally, cases brought in state court that could have also been brought in federal court
are removable by the defendant to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006). In federal court,
federal law governs procedural issues such as summary judgment. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958). Thus, removal to federal court would allow a
defendant to avoid the application of the scintilla rule.
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from the beginning of the litigation that the law in South Carolina is unique and
that the client's experiences with litigation in other states will not hold true under
the Hancock standard8 2
From a practice standpoint, if the client or counsel decides to pursue
summary judgment, defense counsel should change her approach to the
documentary evidence she attaches to her memoranda. It is axiomatic that a
defense counselor should look for areas in the plaintiffs characterization of the
facts of a case to seek a dearth of proof on a particular element of the cause of
action to exploit in the motion for summary judgment8 3 However, it is also
common for defense counsel to attach affirmative evidence in support of her
client's position. Because trial judges have no authority to conduct the
reasonableness analysis set forth in Anderson and no choice but to allow a case
to proceed past the summary judgment stage if the plaintiff has any evidence,
even the defendant's overwhelmin evidence vis-a-vis the plaintiffs will not
suffice at this stage of the litigation. As a result, the best strategy when seeking
a fact-based grant of summary judgment is for defense counsel to seek out issues
on which the plaintiff will likely fail to muster any evidentiary support. If a
particular piece of the plaintiffs cause of action lacks any evidence, defense
counsel should simply point out to the trial judge that there is not even a scintilla
of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position8 5 or, if possible, introduce
affirmative evidence contrary to the plaintiffs allegation. However, defense
counsel-and, indeed, defendants themselves-must be prepared to have her

82. The situation envisioned here is that of the corporate defendant, which is routinely sued
in many jurisdictions.
83. Ideally, defense counsel will pore over the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint,
looking for deficiencies in order to make a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In light of
the South Carolina Supreme Court officially lowering the summary judgment standard, perhaps
defense counsel should more aggressively pursue the 12(b)(6) motion in an effort to avoid the
factual inquiry of summary judgment altogether. Indeed, South Carolina's pleading standard is more
rigorous that that of the federal courts. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (stating that a plaintiff in
federal court must make "a short and plain statement of the grounds" that entitle the plaintiff to
relief (emphasis added)), with S.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (establishing that a plaintiff in South Carolina
state court must plead "a short and plain statement of the facts" that entitle the plaintiff to relief
(emphasis added)).
84. As discussed above in Part II.B., the definition of scintilla used in South Carolina comes
from the Turner case: "A scintilla of evidence is any material evidence that, if true, would tend to
establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror." Turner v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 176 S.C.
260, 263, 180 S.E. 55, 57 (1935) (quoting Taylor v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 78 S.C. 552, 556, 59
S.E. 641, 643 (1907)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A scintilla of evidence, then, needs to be
only evidence in favor of a plaintiff's position; it does not have to be evidence such that it could
support a verdict for that party. Also, Hancock potentially casts doubt on the validity of cases such
as Turner and Young. See supra Part III.B (discussing the disadvantages of the Hancock decision).
85. The practice described here is analogous to motions made in federal court pursuant to the
seminal Celotex decision. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (referring to
the summary judgment standard under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Even a
summary judgment motion made in the Celotex posture, however, faces a difficult challenge in
overcoming the Hancock rule.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2010

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61: 737

motion for summary judgment denied if the plaintiff does produce some
unforeseen evidence, however small, in support of his claims.
Finally, counselors always have the option of advocating for a change in the
law. Such a change could come through either judicial or legislative means.
Young provides an example of the former type of change. As previously
discussed, the South Carolina Supreme Court in that case announced a rule
"supplemental" to the scintilla rule that would allow a JNOV if there was only
one "reasonable inference" to be drawn from the evidence. 86 Thus, Young
interpreted the scintilla rule in terms of the higher standard of "reasonableness"
used by the federal courts and most other states.8 7 However, the supreme court's
differentiation of the scintilla standard from the federal "reasonableness"
standard in Hancock calls Young's supplemental rule into question. In future
cases, an attorney practicing before the supreme court could urge the court to
reaffirm the validity of the language from Young. Because Young is still
technically good law, perhaps this position would find favor with the court. The
logical extension of this argument would be, as Morgan suggests,"8 that South
Carolina has a de facto interpretation of the scintilla rule that echoes the majority
rule. The next step, then, would be to urge the court to adopt the Anderson rule
officially and do away with
the "dead wood" of the scintilla standard, as the
89
Nugent court saw fit to do.
While theoretically possible, a judicial solution to the Hancock dilemma is
unlikely. Primarily, the strong language the court used in describing the quantum
of evidence necessary to defeat a summary judgment motion-the "mere
scintilla" 90 -indicates the court intentionally set the standard low, presumably
lower than the Young court did. Also, the Hancock opinion was a unanimous
decision. 91 Because judicial change in this area is unlikely, a defense practitioner
desiring a change in the law would be better served petitioning the legislature for
the abrogation of the scintilla rule. Alabama, identified by Morgan as one of the
last two states to hold onto the scintilla standard,92 abandoned the scintilla
standard by statute in 1987. 93 The wording of the statute leaves no doubt as to
the effect of the law: "The scintilla rule of evidence is hereby abolished in all
civil actions in the courts of the State of Alabama. 0 4 Instead, the statute adopts
the "substantial evidence" test to determine whether an issue of fact should go to

86. See Young v. Hyman Motors, Inc., 199 S.C. 233, 243, 19 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1942)
(quoting Nat'l Bank of Honea Path v. Thomas J. Barrett, Jr., & Co., 173 S.C. 1,5, 174 S.E. 581, 582
(1934)).
87. See Morgan, supra note 11, at 178.

88. Id.
89.

See Nugent v. Nugent's Ex'r, 135 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Ky. 1940).

90. Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009).
91. See id.
at 328, 332, 673 S.E.2d at 802-03 (indicating that Justices Waller, Pleicones, and
Beatty, and acting Justice Moore concurred in the opinion written by Chief Justice Toal).
92. See Morgan, supra note 11, at 178.
93. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-12 hist. n. (LexisNexis 2005).
94. Id.§ 12-21-12(b).
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the jury and defines the test as follows: "Substantial evidence shall mean
evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons in
the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions as to the
existence of the fact sought to be proven." 95 Though not using the same wording
as the federal standard from Anderson, the inquiry for courts in Alabama is not
whether the evidence simply tends to support a party on an issue but whether
there is enough evidence for reasonable people to debate the existence of the fact
in question. By its terms, this standard decreases the chances that unmeritorious
cases will reach Alabama juries. Defense attorneys in South Carolina could
lobby the legislature to adopt a new rule, following the Anderson language or the
Alabama language, in an effort to get the scintilla standard abrogated in this
state.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's affirmation of the scintilla as the
evidentiary burden that a plaintiff must meet to survive a summary judgment
motion is both regressive when compared to the national trend and likely to
decrease judicial efficiency in South Carolina. Defense counsel in this state must
be conscious that the line of cases from the court of appeals holding otherwise is
no longer good law. Further, defense attorneys must adjust their strategies at the
summary judgment stage to avoid being blindsided by the now low standard. For
the long-term, the legal community must not abandon petitioning the South
Carolina Supreme Court, or the legislature, for a change in the standard-a
standard that should have been rejected long ago.
Aaron J Hayes

95.

Id.§ 12-21-12(d).
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